

























The economic crisis of the West has 
opened up the crucial question of liberal 
democracy. It is about political togeth-
erness and its institutional articulation. 
It has already appeared as a request for 
questioning democracy as such. Some 
theoreticians (like Jacques Rancière and, 
much later, Collin Crouch) consider it a 







THE RULE OF NOBODY! 
DOES IT MAKE 
SENSE TODAY?
Summary  I would like to contribute to the ongoing debate on democracy by discussing 
the notion of the rule of nobody. I first address Rosanvallon’s theory of counter-democracy 
and Keane’s concept of monitory democracy. Keane writes about ‘monitory democracy’ not 
only as a new phase in the development of democracy on a global scale, but primarily as an 
abolishment of all domination in human relations. His idea that in a monitory democracy 
‘no body rules’, has been criticized by John Dunn and John Gray. They consider it meaning-
less to claim that in democracy ‘no body rules’, since every form of rule needs rulers. I would 
like to show that both this supposedly realistic criticism and Keane’s version of the rule of 
nobody are too literal and superficial. If we consider democracy to be a kind of sentiment 
rather than a set of political institutions, we get closer to the puzzling idea that ‘no body 
rules’. This idea, namely, is not about abolishing the rule of men over men, but about be-
ing aware of the contingency of all forms of mastery. This was well known to Plato and has 
been convincingly revived in the works of the French philosopher Jacques Rancière.*
Keywords  democracy, counter-democracy, monitory democracy, rule of nobody
* This is a slightly revised version of the paper delivered at the 22nd IPSA World Congress of Po-
litical Science in Madrid, 7th-12th July 2012. This paper is partly based on my previous article 

























mocracy that they called ‘post-demo-
cracy’. It should be underscored that this 
type of democracy is neither democra-
cy for the postmodern era nor an order 
that comes after representative demo-
cracy. According to Rancière, it is always 
about “a government practice and con-
ceptual legitimization of a democracy 
after demos...” (Rancière, 1999: 102). 
Post-democracy is a political order 
in which oligarchy, developed through 
representative democracy, tries to act re-
gardless of the people. It can also be called 
consensual democracy that is some kind 
of “a reasonable agreement between in-
dividuals and social groups who have 
understood that knowing what is possi-
ble and negotiating between parties is a 
way for each party to obtain the optimal 
share that the objective givens of the si-
tuation allow them to hope for and which 
is preferable to conflict” (ibid.). This type 
of ‘democracy’ has been developing for 
the last thirty years. In that period, all 
of the people’s ‘wrongs’ have been called 
‘populism’. But the situation has radical-
ly changed and the previously described 
order can no longer keep even the most 
basic parts of the ‘consensus’ going. 
Even in Croatia, where nobody could 
have imagined any opposition to ‘post-
-democracy’, we have been witnessing 
different types of democratic resistance 
to it, from the student movements to the 
protests by farmers. All the conventional 
areas of liberal democracy (political par-
ties, mainstream media, etc.) have been 
surprised by either their style of protest 
or the range of issues they have raised. 
It is quite easy to see that some of these 
movements are not very representa-
tive of liberal democracy and the subse-
quent type of citizenship. Due to the fact 
that forms of citizenship and democratic 
movements are deeply interconnected in 
the contemporary world, some authors 
have been forced to reconsider the con-
cept of democracy and, consequently, 
citizenship. I would like to outline some 
current notions of democracy and how 
they fit in with the new practice of demo-
cratic citizenship that we are witnessing 
today. I will first address Rosanvallon’s 
idea of counter-democracy and Keane’s 
concept of monitory democracy. After 
that I will turn to a realistic critique of 
Keane’s idea of democracy as ‘the rule of 
nobody’ (John Gray and John Dunn). Fi-
nally I will show that all these theories 
fell short in their attempt to explain the 
challenges facing the new democratic 
citizenship today. Rancière’s theory can 
be more appropriate for the task. 
New Types of Democracy
The French theoretician Pierre Ro-
sanvallon describes this new condition as 
‘counter-democracy’. Counter-democra-
cy is related to “practices that society 
uses to put pressure on its politicians” 
(2008: 290). He has a pretty simple the-
sis: since liberal democracy hasn’t ful-
filled its promises, various alternative 
forms of democratic action have come 
to reality. As he says, we live in ‘an age 
of distrust’ that takes its toll in an ever 
wider gap between society and the politi-
cal sphere. Today it is very fashionable to 
maintain a considerable distance to for-
mal institutions and to undermine “the 
assumption of trust conferred by elec-
tions” (ibid.: 253). In that way, ‘counter-
-democracy’ restricts formal democracy, 
since “elected officials are reined and lose 
the room for maneuvering owing to pres-
sure by voters themselves”. It can be said 
that “the dynamics of control take prece-
dence over appropriation of power”. 
It occurs to us that this is neither 

























nor “protection of the individual from 
encroachments by public authority” 
(ibid.: 6), but about democratic distrust 
that aims to “make sure that elected offi-
cials keep their promises and find ways to 
maintain pressure on the government to 
serve the common good” (ibid.: 8). What 
kind of democratic mechanisms have 
been available to citizens in that sense? 
Rosanvallon tries to find them in the 
three dimensions of counter-democra-
cy: surveillance, prevention, and judg-
ment. Surveillance is related to various 
possibilities of controlling and exposing 
elected officials available to citizens. Pre-
vention is connected with the organiza-
tion of functional resistance to the poli-
cies that are suggested and processed by 
incumbents. And finally, Rosanvallon 
considers that there is a lot of room for 
putting incumbents on trial by the peo-
ple (the people as judge). 
Interestingly enough, Rosanvallon is 
not naïve to think that it is just another 
story on how to serve the common good 
by concerned citizens. To be sure, citi-
zens have become political consumers 
with high expectations from political in-
stitutions. Besides, Rosanvallon rejects 
the ‘myth of the politically passive citi-
zen’ and claims that “the people are om-
nipresent and no longer content to make 
their voice heard only on election day” 
(ibid.: 254). The problem here is that the 
people in Rosanvallon’s counter-demo-
cracy are too sober, since nobody be-
lieves in the possibility of global alter-
natives to things as they are now. There-
fore, the key idea is not a revolution, but 
permanent moral criticism of incum-
bents that tries to keep the people alert. 
A similar idea was developed by 
the Australian theoretician John Keane 
(2009), who put a lot of effort into intro-
ducing the concept of monitory demo-
cracy. According to Keane, we are wit-
nessing the creation of a ‘post-repre-
sentative democracy’ since the impact 
of representative institutions, parties and 
parliaments on day to day life has been 
decreasing. Keane claims that citizens 
make the life of politicians increasingly 
complex, putting in question their au-
thority. Monitoring is practiced on dif-
ferent levels and by various bodies of mo-
nitory democracy: assembly of citizens, 
juries, advisory bodies, think-tanks, and 
consumer counsels. In this conception, 
the above institutions have many roles. 
They usually begin their activities by col-
lecting on behalf of the public additional 
insights and information about the acti-
vities and features of various governmen-
tal and non-governmental bodies. 
Keane in fact rejects any possibili-
ty that he revives in this way the spirit 
of ‘the rule of the people’. Since we live 
in different times, it is impossible, even 
though many people still don’t under-
stand it and behave as if they were still 
living in ancient Greece. In fact, Keane 
doesn’t have any sentiment with re-
gard to direct forms of democracy. On 
the contrary, Keane’s concept of moni-
tory democracy keeps the institution 
of election democracy alive. Unwilling 
to engage the masses, Keane insists on 
developing divergent deliberative me-
chanisms that disclose an illusion of a 
united ‘sovereign’ people. Moreover, 
monitory democracy can be used on a 
daily basis as an obstacle to empowering 
the masses or the concerned people.
Both authors have expressed system-
atic doubts regarding populism because 
they reject the so-called pure people’s 
will that is promoted by irresponsible 
political leaders. Rosanvallon hopes to 
avoid it, affirming some civil society or-
























est groups, are not oriented towards pro-
tecting the interests of their members. 
There are at least two consequences of 
this conception: if politics is reduced 
only to its counter-democratic func-
tions, it would be limited to its counter-
ing forms. In that case, politics would be 
left to different groups of experts, pos-
sibly under the significant influence of 
various wealthy individuals and groups. 
Therefore, this type of democracy or citi-
zenship can push the so-called ordinary 
citizens far away from the political pro-
cess (see Urbinati, 2010).
Gray’s Critique of Keane’s 
Idea of Democracy
At the beginning of his critique 
(2009), Gray quotes Max Weber: “such 
concepts as ‘the will of the people’, ‘true 
will of the people’ have long since ceased 
to exist for me. They are fictions. All 
ideas aiming at abolishing the domi-
nance of humans by others are utopian”. 
All in all, it seems to him that, realisti-
cally speaking, democracy can do many 
things but it can’t abolish the rule of one 
man over another. Gray does not deny 
Keane’s efforts “in rewriting the history 
of the democracy, showing that demo-
cratic government is in no way a spe-
cifically western achievement”, but he is 
thoroughly opposed to his idea that “de-
mocracy is a now a global norm”. Name-
ly it is one thing to say that democracy 
is not the cultural property of the West, 
and another to contend that it is a uni-
versal political super-value dominating 
others. Therefore Gray considers de-
mocracy as just one value among many, 
regardless of its universal desirability. 
He finds some commonsensical reasons 
for it. For example, citizens would like a 
lot of things from governments, such as 
security, a reliable level of social pros-
perity, ensuring a proper level of tole-
rance of life styles... It is fairly obvious 
that democracy is not a crucial tool to 
realize any of the above. He finds sup-
port for his position in the fact that le-
gitimacy of “the current regime in China 
does not depend on whether it embraces 
democracy, assembly-based, representa-
tive or monitory”, but on how much the 
regime can assure the living standard 
of its people. Gray puts democracy on 
an equal level with other ‘non-material 
goods’ such as tolerance, even though he 
believes that “the most important thing 
among them is the freedom to live your 
life as you please”. We can draw the con-
clusion that Gray finds the value of to-
lerance more politically important than 
democracy as a political regime.
Another critique of Keane’s idea of 
democracy comes from Gray’s empiri-
cal insight that democracy is historical-
ly connected to ethnic cleansing. He be-
lieves democracy pushes different types 
of identities to the forefront of the po-
litical scene, which can be somewhat 
dangerous in multi-ethnic and multi-
religious countries. The reason can be 
found in the constant submission of dif-
ferent minorities in authoritarian states. 
These minorities, after the break-up 
of that type of state, are not wiling to 
be permanent minorities even in a de-
mocracy; therefore a solution would 
be to give minorities their own state. 
Gray came to the conclusion that while 
monitory democracy would hold go-
vernments under constant scrutiny, too 
much monitoring “is a recipe for paraly-
sis”. Furthermore, the majority of people 
all around the world don’t want to make 
“a fetish of democracy”. They just want 
an efficient government which can prop-
erly protect their interests. Consequent-
ly, the idea of democracy as the “rule of 

























perimental circumstances. It is therefore 
enough for Gray to have democracy va-
lued according to its instrumental fea-
ture rather than for its own sake.
Dunn’s Thoughts on Democracy
John Dunn, a respected historian of 
political ideas, wrote a somewhat sober 
history of democracy in his book De-
mocracy: a History (2005). In it he ex-
plores the usage of democracy as a politi-
cal concept in the works of thinkers and 
politicians, such as Madison, Sieyes and 
Robespierre, who contributed to a resur-
rection of democracy after thousands of 
years. During their lifetime it started to 
be connected with the political equality of 
the people which was articulated by their 
representatives. Contrasting the notori-
ousness of democracy, originating from 
the Antique with its current eminence, 
Dunn asked the key question in his book: 
Why has democracy become an unques-
tionable value and regime today? As de-
mocracy had been considered an unsta-
ble rule by mid-19th century, it was hardly 
expected that we would ever be in a situ-
ation where rejecting democracy would 
mean “sooner or later to write yourself 
out of politics” (Dunn, 2005: 41). 
To assess democracy properly, he first 
tried to define what it means. According 
to him, democracy is a Greek word ac-
cepted by all the peoples or, rather, an 
‘unmistakably global term’. But he insist-
ed that it is not just a word – it is also an 
idea that the word can be used to convey. 
Unfortunately, Dunn didn’t explain prop-
erly this quality of democracy as a poli-
tical term. He missed an opportunity to 
say that from the time of the French Re-
volution the word started functioning in 
a somewhat tense relationship between 
historical experience and expectations. 
This friction should have been solved by 
acting politically, as it has occurred many 
times during modern revolutions. There-
fore democracy as a word was revived at 
the time because “it served the purpose 
of theoretically anticipating future his-
torical movement and practically influ-
encing it” (Koselleck, 2004: 273).
Regarding the contemporary popu-
larity of democracy, John Dunn doesn’t 
take its current eminence for granted. 
He showed that democracy today means 
both institutions and practices concern-
ing that idea. But as he also considers 
democracy to be a kind of sentiment, 
and not just a set of political institutions, 
he gets closer to the puzzling idea that 
‘no body rules’. He is deeply aware that 
current forms of democracy are both 
far from its antique origin and the lite-
ral sense of rule of everybody, but he 
doesn’t seem to feel any particular regret 
over it. Even though democracy as a po-
litical value has largely contributed to in-
troducing equality in almost all spheres 
of society (for example, a redefinition 
of the relationship between women and 
men), he lives in peace with inequality 
concerning the “regime of egoism” or 
capitalism. He is of the opinion that the 
“democratization of everything human” 
is not possible or that it is an illusion, at 
least concerning private property. This 
thought is not entirely without fault. It 
means leaving the idea of abolishing the 
rule of men over men, which has always 
been the heart of democracy. In fact, we 
should persist with the idea of demo-
cracy as the contingency of all forms of 
mastery. Only in that way we can hold 
onto the real meaning of the term origi-
nating from Plato’s Republic.
Rancière’s Dissent Democracy
The previous authors gave us a rela-
























ral democracy. On that basis, it is possi-
ble to know who rules and how. Unlike 
them, Jacques Rancière (2008) seriously 
develops the idea that ‘nobody rules’. To 
understand democracy as such, he has 
been going back to its roots in ancient 
Greece. He emphasizes that democracy 
has always had at least two faces: first-
ly, the permissive society; secondly, de-
mocracy is not an order, which is due, 
as Plato said, to the fact that freedom 
authorizes it to have all possible orders. 
Furthermore, democracy means a re-
versal of all relationships that human so-
ciety is comprised of: a subject doesn’t 
obey a ruler, a wife a husband, a teach-
er is afraid of a pupil, and even a horse 
and a donkey push past one who doesn’t 
allow them to pass on the street (Plato, 
2001; Rancière, 2008; Kursar, 2011).
But Rancière says that the whole 
contemporary social theory which deals 
with consumer society hides a maneuver 
to stop an allegedly even bigger damage. 
It must halt a situation in which demo-
cracy is not just a form of society, but the 
very principle of politics, “the principle 
founding the ‘good’ rule that is based on 
absence of founding” (Rancière, 2008: 
48). What is the source of this absence 
of founding? Rancière again points to 
Plato, who wrote that “there is a possi-
bility of choice that comes from the God 
of coincidence, the draw that represents 
democratic procedures used by people 
of equality to decide on the distribution 
of positions” (ibid.: 51). Since variously 
defined nobles have been living from the 
respect for the value of origin, age, and 
cleverness, they are not conditioned by 
the luck of the draw. That law disdains 
these values, and the conflict is created.
It is from that point, according to 
Rancière, that politics started its adven-
ture. It is however no longer about an 
individual who serves his passions and 
sometimes is prone to laziness (Plato), 
but that democracy is an anarchic en-
titlement, “characteristic of those who 
don’t have entitlements either to rule or 
to be ruled” (ibid.: 58). Therefore, de-
mocracy is obviously neither a type of in-
stitution nor a population as such, some 
majority, working class people... Demo-
cracy also doesn’t exist simply because 
‘the law declares the individuals equal 
and the collectivity master of itself ’ (see 
Rancière, 2007). In that way democracy 
fights routine models of government that 
can be founded on one or another way 
of distributing (positions and chances). 
Rancière calls that distribution ‘police’. If 
such political regimes wish to be some-
thing more (than gerontocracy or oligar-
chy), they needs some assistance from 
those who have no part. Hence ‘the demo-
cratic scandal’ shows the intervention 
in the order of non-equality which, ulti-
mately, creates a political community. 
With regard to human rights, he 
considers them redundant if you already 
have them or if you are a citizen of a 
concrete political community. And if we 
think that they are connected to humans 
as such, regardless of their membership 
in a political community, we only justify 
a depoliticized account of human rights. 
Rancière strongly believes that politi-
cal subjects are neither humans as such, 
nor, for example, some identities that 
come from the constitutional text. They 
are rather defined in an interval of their 
private identities, enacted by either the 
constitution or social relations (‘the lo-
gic of police’).
What does it mean? Historically, dif-
ferent democratic movements have been 
keen to reduce the impact of what Ran-
cière calls ‘natural endowments’. Conse-

























police’ that has eliminated some subjects 
from the political body. In short, demo-
cratic movements have always had two 
purposes: firstly, to spread further the 
influence of the public man to different 
spheres of the community life, and se-
condly, to reestablish the belonging of all 
to the public sphere that has always been 
under threat of privatization (see Kursar, 
2011). 
Democratic Insurrection as Part 
of Dissent Democracy
On the basis of Rancière’s ideas it is 
possible to get a better grip of today’s dis-
sent citizenship. We are witnessing new 
kinds of democratic movements that 
claim that the politicians ‘don’t represent 
us’. These movements offer just a glimpse 
into the general feeling of concern and 
anger in some countries of Southern Eu-
rope where they have been enjoying sig-
nificant public support (for example, in 
Spain). It is no longer about civil disobe-
dience, since that disobedience is justi-
fied only if your basic rights are in serious 
jeopardy. Therefore the new democratic 
movements don’t claim qualification or 
exception to some kind of majority rule 
or the protection of basic liberties or 
rights. We can find some of their roots in 
the anti-globalization movement during 
the nineties, when it rose up against the 
institutions of global capitalism (IMF, 
World Bank...). Its intention was to im-
pose the principles of political, if not 
democratic, decision-making in the tra-
ditional space of economy.
Today they are fed by a growing gap 
that has been created between tradition-
al political parties and something that 
the people want. New democratic move-
ments are now using so-called demo-
cratic insurrection that has disregard-
ed democracy as a state-form and goes 
through democratic practices based on 
deliberation, decision and action. Thus 
citizens who are engaged in it can ig-
nore the so-called election aristocracy. It 
can be shown to be even more subver-
sive to liberal democracy since citizens, 
on the one hand, ignore institutions of 
representative democracy (political par-
ties, elections...) and, on the other hand, 
as an active citizenship, create huge pres-
sure from the bottom. To be even more 
efficient, they prefer to liberate space for 
these democratic practices. In that way 
they sometimes try to reorganize parti-
cular institutions (universities, for exam-
ple) as democratic assemblies. That form 
of deliberation and decision-making can 
be organized on different levels, from lo-
cal communities to the state, and even as 
a trans-national network of assemblies. 
In that way they can create so-called 
common or shared material resour-
ces and the results of social production; 
shared knowledge, affects, values and 
understandings (see Murray, 2010). 
The new democratic citizenship goes 
significantly beyond the theories of de-
mocracy that were offered by Rosan-
vallon and Keane. They are still firmly 
inside the story of democracy as a state-
-form and not truthfully connected to 
the idea of democracy as ‘the rule of no-
body’. In that sense Rancière’s idea of de-
mocracy is much more flexible because 
he understands democracy as a pro-
cess of subjectivization that doesn’t need 
politics as a fixed sphere. Moreover, this 
process of subjectivization continuous-
ly denies a clear border between politics 
and other spheres. Therefore democra-
tic movements have always been mov-
ing borders between the public, political 
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Demokracija kao vladavina nikoga! Ima li danas smisla?
SAŽETAK U članku autor želi doprinijeti aktualnoj raspravi o demokraciji problematizira-
njem ideje ‘vladavine nikoga’. Prvo se bavi Rosanvallonovom teorijom kontrademokracije 
i Keaneovom koncepcijom nadzorne demokracije. Keane smatra da ‘nadzorna demokraci-
ja’ nije samo nova faza u razvoju demokracije na globalnoj razini nego se prije svega radi 
o dokidanju svih oblika dominacije u ljudskim odnosima. Dunn i Gray kritiziraju njego-
vu ideju da u takvoj demokraciji ‘nitko ne vlada’. Oni smatraju da nema smisla tvrditi da 
u demokraciji ‘nitko ne vlada’ budući da svaki oblik vladavine treba vladare. Autor članka 
nastoji pokazati da su ove navodno realistične kritike, ali i Keaneovo shvaćanje koncepci-
je ‘nitko ne vlada’ previše mehaničke, odnosno da su doslovno shvatile spomenutu kon-
cepciju. Ako bi demokraciju vidjeli kao vrstu osjećaja prije nego skup političkih institucija, 
onda bi prije proniknuli u ponešto zagonetnu ideju o ‘vladavini nikoga’. Ova ideja, naime, 
ne znači dokidanje vladavine čovjeka nad čovjekom, nego se odnosi na svijest o kontin-
gentnosti svih oblika gospodstva. To je bilo dobro poznato Platonu i uvjerljivo je oživljeno 
u djelima francuskog filozofa Jacquesa Rancièrea.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI demokracija, kontrademokracija, nadzorna demokracija, vladavina nikoga
